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What's Wrong with (How We Think About) Torture?
The torture debate
In the immediate wake of 9/11 there was a rash of debates -both public and private -about the justification of using torture to prevent further terrorist attacks. The form of these debates was always consequentialist, balancing the possible benefits of what could be discovered through torturing a captured terrorist against the possible harms inflicted upon the terrorist being tortured. In other words, the question of justification almost always came down to whether a torture victim's sufferingeven if the victim was a terrorist -could be outweighed by the number of lives saved by the information this suffering produced. One of the most discussed arguments in favor of justifying torture in this manner is the "ticking bomb case," which, as discussed in the previous chapter, Alan Dershowitz helped to make famous and Jeff McMahan found to be just as useful for discussion as actual cases of torture. If, as the case goes, thousands of innocent lives can be saved only through torturing a captured terrorist who otherwise refuses to disclose the location of a hidden bomb set to go off imminently, then we must be justified in the use of torture. Almost as if in response to any possible doubt about the relevance to reality of this hypothetical scenario, the television show 24 turned this scenario into a perpetual plot point over the course of seven seasons as protagonist Jack Bauer "encounter[ed] a ticking time bomb an average of 12 times every season," which -because each season was meant to represent 24 hours in real-time -means that "Bauer encounter[ed] someone who need[ed] torturing 12 times per day."
1 The show was such a hit, drawing "10 to 15 million viewers" at the "height of its popularity," that Fox is planning to bring the show back in 2014.
When confronted with such an argument and with such a television show, we may be tempted to initially balk at the apparent callousness of turning torture into a numbers game. It can be difficult however to say what is specifically wrong with torturing one terrorist bent on our destruction in order to save innocent lives, lives he himself put in danger. Whether we choose to see this situation in consequentialist terms as Dershowitz does, or more in terms of responsibility as Walzer and McMahan do, it would appear that our "gut feeling" that torture is wrong and never to be used simply does not coincide with our "moral intuitions" as revealed by the ticking bomb case. Proponents of this argument therefore challenge that their critics are clinging to an impractical and dangerous idealism unless they can show that the terrorist's suffering from being tortured would either outweigh the deaths from the terrorist's bomb or make irrelevant whatever responsibility the terrorist has for creating the situation in the first place.
David Sussman took up this challenge in his article "What's Wrong with Torture?" 3 To answer this question, Sussman investigates what it is that makes torture morally worse than both war and punishment insofar as torture is related to both and yet, unlike torture, we generally seem to find war and punishment to be justifiable in certain situations. However, this does not mean that Sussman's aim is to merely show that torture can be seen as a more extreme version of attacking an enemy combatant or of how we treat prisoners through ordinary judicial means. Instead, Sussman argues that "there is a core concept of what constitutes torture that corresponds to a distinctive kind of wrong that is not characteristically found in other forms of extreme violence or coercion, a special type of wrong that may explain why we find torture to be more morally offensive than other ways of inflicting great physical or psychological harm." 4 Sussman discovers this "core concept" in the relationship between the torturer and the tortured, and in particular in the relationship between the "intentions" 5 of the torturer and the "complicity" 6 of the tortured. Sussman, like Elaine Scarry -whose work The Body in Pain he also refers to here -uses Jean Améry's philosophical analyses of the torture he underwent while a prisoner of the Nazis during World War II to try to understand this relationship. Sussman and Scarry both take from Améry's descriptions of his torturers as the "counter-man," 7 as "the other," 8 as the "antiman" or "monster," 9 that it is the asymmetric relationship between torturer and tortured that reveals why torture is a fate worse than death. As Scarry writes:
However near the prisoner the torturer stands, the distance between their physical realities is colossal, for the prisoner is in overwhelming
